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Abstract 
Rituals are a ubiquitous feature of human behavior, yet we know little about 
the cognitive mechanisms that enable children to recognize them and respond 
accordingly. In this study, 3 to 6 year old children living in Bushman 
communities in South Africa were shown a sequence of causally irrelevant 
actions that differed in the extent to which goal demotion was a feature. The 
children consistently replicated the causally irrelevant actions but when such 
actions were also fully goal demoted they were reproduced at significantly 
higher rates. These findings highlight how causal opacity and goal demotion 
work in tandem to demarcate actions as being ritualistic, and specifically, 
how goal demotion uniquely influences the reproduction of ritualistic actions.  
 
Keywords: ritual; causal opacity; goal demotion; over-imitation; social 
learning, cultural transmission  
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Rituals bind individuals into groups, and are thought to have played a crucial 
role in the emergence of complex societies (Norenzayan et al., 2016; 
Whitehouse & Lanman, 2014). Until recently, the study of rituals has 
primarily been conducted by anthropologists using qualitative 
methodologies. This has made it difficult for those in the quantitative fields to 
establish robust generalizations about the causes and effects of ritual on social 
cognition and behavior (Rappaport, 1999; Rossano, 2012).  The absence of 
such foundational knowledge represents a problem for understanding how 
rituals are acquired and understood throughout human development. If 
rituals play a role in the formation of groups and more complex societies, we 
must understand how (and when) children contribute to (or are influenced 
by) this process. Two candidate features of ritual that allow us to discern 
actions as non-ordinary are causal opacity and goal demotion. The aim of the 
current research was to investigate how these features of ritual influence 
young children’s learning proclivities.  
Rituals comprise conventional actions that feature repetition, 
redundancy, formality, and stereotypy, in which production of the process is 
prioritized over the achievement of the outcome (Legare & Souza, 2014; 
Sørensen, 2007). Causal opacity and goal demotion are a consequence of these 
features (Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015, 2017). Causal opacity is generated when 
actions are uninterpretable from the perspective of physical causality as the 
actions lack an intuitive or observable connecting relation between the 
specific action performed (e.g., synchronized dancing) and the desired 
outcome or effect (e.g., making it rain) (Legare & Souza, 2012, 2014; Sørensen, 
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2007; Whitehouse, 2012). Goal demotion refers to an observer’s ability to infer 
and understand an actor’s reason (e.g., goals or motivations) for producing a 
given action sequence (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015, 
2017; Schjoedt et al., 2013). The key distinction between causally irrelevant 
and goal demoted actions is that, in the former, it is unclear what an actor’s 
actions achieve, whereas in the latter it is unclear why the actor is motivated 
to perform them. Take someone twirling a cloth around in a circular motion 
in the air several times, with no causally identifiable outcome resulting from 
the action, this would constitute a causally opaque action (“what effect does 
that action have?”). If they use the cloth to then scrub an apparently already 
clean table this would constitute a goal demoted action; The causality of the 
action is transparent (i.e., to clean the table) but the intention driving it is not 
(i.e., why is the actor doing it?). Notably, rituals tend to be both opaque and 
goal demoted, and as a result are rarely dissociated both practically, and in 
the literature. 
When actions are ritualistic, the inability to attribute causal- and 
intentional-understanding increases until it is clear to the observer that such 
actions are being performed for reasons other than to satisfy an instrumental 
outcome. Prior research has found that adults treat objects subjected to such 
actions differently from objects subjected to ordinary action (Kapitány & 
Nielsen, 2015, 2017; Vohs, Wang, Gino, & Norton, 2013). However, no 
published study has directly or empirically explored how children interpret 
and respond to causally irrelevant and goal demoted actions. 
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There are multiple ways in which children show social and cognitive 
preparedness to adopt the ritualized behaviors of those around them (see 
Legare & Nielsen, 2015). According to a number of authors (Rossano, 2012; 
Wilks, Kapitány, & Nielsen, 2016) the most compelling example is 
‘overimitation’, whereby children reliably copy visibly causally irrelevant 
actions modelled to them by an adult (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Nielsen, 2006) 
– notably these actions are typically causally opaque. For example, Nielsen 
and Tomaselli (2010) had an experimenter show children (aged 2 to 13 years) 
how to retrieve a toy from a closed box (e.g., by pushing open a trap door). 
Although the box could easily be opened by hand, the adult complicated the 
demonstration by swiping a miscellaneous object across the top of the box in 
a causally irrelevant manner, then using the same object to open the box. 
Children replicated the model's object use and incorporated the causally 
irrelevant actions into their response, and did so regardless of whether they 
lived in a large, industrialized Western city or in Bushman communities of 
the Kalahari Desert.  
Extending this design, Nielsen and colleagues (2015) presented 
preschool children with actions that included opening a box and retrieving an 
object. In one condition, before the box was opened and the object retrieved, 
the sequence incorporated a redundant action (e.g., tapping the top of the box 
with a tool). In a contrasting condition, the redundant action was modelled 
after the object was retrieved from the box. Both conditions feature a causally 
irrelevant action, but only the latter possibly features goal demotion (as it is 
unclear why the experimenter would perform deliberate actions after the 
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afforded goal had been satisfied). Children reproduced the redundant actions 
at statistically similar rates across conditions. Whether the redundant action 
occurred before or after the goal of the sequence had been achieved, its 
reproduction was neither diminished nor increased. Actions in which goal 
demotion is emphasized thus appear to arouse similar levels of reproduction 
as actions in which it is not emphasized. However, the overall sequence was 
still associated with a goal, even if some redundant actions occurred after the 
goal had been satisfied. Does goal demotion cue conventional responses and 
arouse high fidelity reproduction if an action sequence is simply devoid of 
any afforded goal? And given the importance of contiguity in learning 
(Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007) is goal demotion a continuous dimension, such that 
as the contiguity of action and outcome declines, goal demotion increases? 
To investigate this we presented children aged 3 to 6 years with 
versions of the task employed by Nielsen et al. (2015). Children were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions. In a control ‘Goal Apparent’ 
condition, an adult modelled a sequence comprising a causally irrelevant 
action, a causally relevant action, and a second causally irrelevant action 
before retrieving a prize from inside a box. Here, the sequence features 
causally irrelevant actions, but as the action ultimately leads towards the 
satisfaction of a goal – a sticker is retrieved from inside a box – all actions may 
be interpreted as having been motivated in the service of that goal, and hence 
are goal apparent. This was contrasted with three experimental conditions in 
which the degree of goal demotion associated with the actions was altered. In 
a Goal Available Condition the second causally irrelevant action was 
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performed after the goal was realized. As the sticker had already been 
retrieved it is unclear why the second causally irrelevant action was 
performed, but it was nonetheless associated and contiguous with the goal (as 
it was performed as part of the larger action sequence that included a goal). In 
a Goal Unclear Condition all actions were performed as part of a sequence, 
but once the box was opened the sticker was not retrieved. The apparent goal 
of the sequence (retrieving the sticker) was never realized, and the actions and 
the afforded outcome are not contiguous. Finally, in a No Goal Condition the 
sequence was modelled but there was no reward in the box. This last 
condition features complete goal demotion – there is no affordance or 
satisfaction of a causal sequence of events that brings about, or is justified by, 
an outcome: Nor is any degree of contiguity possible. We thus anticipated 
that children in this condition would replicate the irrelevant actions at the 
highest rate. Because of the exploratory nature of this work we made no other 
direct predictions.  
Further, it has recently been argued that the dearth of systematic 
research outside Western cultural contexts presents a major impediment to 
theoretical progress in the developmental sciences (Legare & Harris, 2016; 
Nielsen & Haun, 2016). For this reason we deliberately conducted our 
research with children from Bushman communities in Southern Africa; a 
decision representing a meaningful departure from the otherwise limited and 
homogenous status quo (Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner, & Legare, 2017).  
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Method 
Participants 
All children in the target age-range at the communities we visited were 
invited to participate. Our aim was to test as many as were available and 
willing. Overall cell sizes were thus small, but these are nonetheless in line 
with previous studies conducted with these populations (Nielsen, Mushin, 
Tomaselli, & Whiten, 2014; Nielsen, Tomaselli, Mushin, & Whiten, 2014) and 
with comparable cross-cultural social learning research (e.g., Berl & Hewlett, 
2015). Sixty-five Bushman children (33 male; 32 female) thus participated in 
this experiment, but 10 were excluded for a variety of reasons (3 for 
experimenter error; 1 for not engaging with the apparatus; 4 because of 
interference either from other children or a carer; and 2 because of uncertainty 
surrounding their age). Those included in the final sample were aged 
between 3 and 6 years (median age=5 years, mode=5 years). Of the final 55 
children (27 male, 28 female), 31 were living in Platfontein, an immigrant 
settlement in a rural area 15 kilometers west of Kimberley, the provincial 
capital of South Africa’s Northern Cape. All children were members of either 
the !Xun or Khwe clans (for more detail see den Hertog, 2013; Nielsen, 
Mushin, et al., 2014). An additional 24 children were included from 3 different 
‡Khomani settlements in the region of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, 
600kms north-west of Platfontein. These settlements sit on land awarded to 
the ‡Khomani San community as an outcome of a restitution claim settled in 
1999 (Grant, 2011). Prior to this claim the violence and dislocation wrought by 
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colonialism and apartheid resulted in the dispersion of the ‡Khomani, their 
language, and their cultural practices (Tomaselli, 2005). Though advances 
have been and are being made, the children on these settlements, as with 
those from Platfontein, live in sub-economic conditions.  
Though hunting and gathering occasionally and sporadically take 
place in these communities, commodities are primarily acquired through 
commercial and private trade (even though these groups are economically 
disadvantaged compared to those living in cities and more established 
communities). Our participants and their families are exposed to modern 
society and sit both inside and outside of it, balancing contemporary and 
traditional values and ways of life, while dealing with the social and 
economic disadvantages that are a common experience of the world’s 
indigenous peoples (Tomaselli, 2005). These children and the environments in 
which they develop thus contrast starkly with those who typically participate 
in child development research (Nielsen et al., 2017). All children were 
randomly allocated to one of four experimental conditions described below 
and received a small gift for participating (i.e., an item of clothing or small 
toy). The second author has been working in these communities for over 15 
years and is well known to those living there. He was present for all testing. 
The first author conducted the testing which commenced after children had 
spent several minutes playing warm-up games unrelated to the experiment.  
Apparatus 
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Children were presented with two distinct puzzle boxes: A Light Blue box 
(13cm x 17cm x 13cm) that could be opened by lifting a metal hoop upwards 
and a Plain Wood box (30cm x 19cm x 10cm), mounted on two wooden 
supports, that could be opened by pushing the lid up via two small metal 
loops fixed to the front. The Light Blue box was presented with a 19cm 
wooden dowel with a black handle and the Plain Wood box with a 16cm 
yellow drumstick with rubber ball on one end and small hook on the other. 
Stickers were drawn randomly from a large pool and placed inside boxes 
prior to beginning the experiment, where appropriate. We did not directly 
index the value children placed on the stickers. However, stickers constitute a 
resource they rarely have access to and the children typically expressed 
delight when given them as rewards. Further, as children have been shown to 
prioritize imitating for a small reward over engaging in individual learning to 
obtain a large reward (Turner, Giraldeau, & Flynn, 2017) there is little 
foundation to expect the direction of this value to overly impact children’s 
responses.  
Procedure 
Data were collected in June 2014. Children were tested either inside a 
community building or dwelling, or outside sitting on the ground, by the side 
of a house or small community building (see Figure 1). Testing was 
conducted in such a way as to ensure that children could not observe the 
experiment prior to their participation. Children were ushered by a familiar 
member of the local community, who also remained throughout the testing 
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period. An unobtrusively placed camera recorded all test sessions for later 
coding. Children were randomly allocated to one of the following four 
conditions (for a summary see Table 1). We aimed to test all children in the 
communities we visited, stopping only when no more children were available 
(numbers for each condition are indicated below).  
 
Figure 1. Child reproducing the second Causally Irrelevant Action associated 
with the Plain Wood box (LHS) and the Causally Relevant Action associated 
with the Blue box (RHS). 
 Goal Apparent Condition (n=13). The experimenter presented the child 
with the Light Blue box, and picked up the dowel tool. They scraped the tool 
across the top of the box from front to back three times (Causally Irrelevant 
Action 1), then placed it under the metal hoop, pulling it upwards to open the 
box (Causally Relevant Action 1). The dowel was then tapped three times on 
the side of the box (Causally Irrelevant Action 2) and the sticker retrieved by 
hand (Causally Relevant Action 2). This sequence was repeated, with the 
sticker replaced behind the experimenter each time (i.e., out of the child’s 
direct sight) and then the box and tool presented to the child. No instructions 
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were given. Testing concluded after the child satisfied the apparent goal, or 60 
seconds had elapsed. The box was then removed.  
The experimenter then presented the Plain Wood box and the 
associated drumstick. The drumstick was placed ball end down and then 
tipped back and forth three times, using the ball end as a fulcrum (Causally 
Irrelevant Action 1). The drumstick was then held by the ball and the hook 
used to grip one of the metal loops, pulling upwards so as to open the box 
(Causally Relevant Action 1). The stick was then tapped three times on a side 
of the box (Causally Irrelevant Action 2) and the sticker retrieved by hand 
(Causally Relevant Action 2). This sequence was repeated, then the box and 
tool were presented to the child. Again, no instructions were given and the 
child was given 60 seconds to respond. Box order (Light Blue or Wood first) 
was counterbalanced across children.  
Goal Available Condition (n=14). This was identical to the Goal Apparent 
Condition except the sticker was retrieved after the box was opened, placed 
back in the box and then the second causally irrelevant action was 
demonstrated.  
Goal Unclear Condition (n=14). This was identical to the Goal Apparent 
Condition except that the sticker was not retrieved. When the box was opened 
the sticker was present but the experimenter did not deliberately gaze at it or 
place a pause in the action sequence to acknowledge it. This meant that the 
action sequence afforded a goal, but the goal was never explicitly made clear.  
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No Goal Condition (n=14). This was identical to the Goal Apparent 
Condition except there was no sticker inside the box. The actions never 
afforded the observer a goal or motive for the actions. 
Table 1. Summary of action sequences and goals by condition. 
Condition Key Differences 
Goal Apparent 
The apparent goal of the action sequence is to 
retrieve the sticker. 
Causally Irrelevant Action 1 
Causally Relevant Action 1 (box opens) 
Causally Irrelevant Action 2 
Sticker Retrieved 
Goal Available 
The goal of the action sequence is available and 
demonstrated to the participant. 
Causally Irrelevant Action 1 
Causally Relevant Action 1 (box opens) 
Sticker Retrieved and then Replaced 
Causally Irrelevant Action 2 
Goal Unclear 
The afforded goal (to retrieve the sticker) is 
ignored, and thus, is unclear. 
Causally Irrelevant Action 1 
Causally Relevant Action 1 (box opens) 
Causally Irrelevant Action 2 
(Sticker not interacted with, remains 
untouched) 
No Goal 
The box contains no object, and thus, affords no 
obvious goal. 
Causally Irrelevant Action 1 
Causally Relevant Action 1 (box opens) 
Causally Irrelevant Action 2 
 
Coding 
The behavior of participants was coded from videos recorded during 
testing. For each condition children were scored for: (i) the number of 
Causally Irrelevant actions produced (Causally Irrelevant Actions 1 and 2 
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separately); and (ii) whether or not the Causally Relevant actions were 
produced (as they have a functional purpose they are not the focus of this 
research). Children were free to exhibit the modelled actions as much as they 
wanted. A second coder, blind to the study and hypotheses, was presented 
with video from fifteen randomly selected participants (27% of trials). 
According to intraclass correlation coefficients, inter-rater reliability was high 
for all dependent variables: Causally Irrelevant Actions 1 = .97, p < .001; 
Causally Irrelevant Actions 2 = .99, p < .001; and Causally Relevant Actions = 
1.00 p < .001. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses failed to detect any condition-dependent effects 
of sex, age or community. These variables are not considered further. Across 
all conditions only five children did not perform the causally relevant act (as 
demonstrated) to open the blue box and three did not open the wooden box. 
These omissions were not systemic across conditions, and are indicative of 
near-ceiling performance among participants. As such, this variable is not 
considered further.  Given the small cell sizes and non-normally distributed 
data all analyses were conducted using non-parametric tests.  
Figure 2 shows the mean number of times the first and second causally 
irrelevant actions were reproduced across conditions. According to a Kruskal-
Wallis test, the first causally irrelevant action was not performed at 
significantly different rates across conditions, χ2(3, N = 55) = 6.83, p = .08. In 
contrast, we observed a significant difference in the rates of reproduction on 
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the second causally irrelevant action, χ2(3, N = 55) = 14.87, p = .002. Mann-
Whitney post-hoc comparisons revealed that children in the No Goal 
condition produced more actions than children in the Goal Apparent 
(p.<.001), Goal Available (p.=.002) and Goal Unclear (p.=.027) Conditions. No 
other differences were observed.   
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Figure 2. Children’s mean imitation of the first and second causally irrelevant 
actions (error bars indicate standard errors).  
 Children were modelled each irrelevant action three times on each box, 
meaning there were six of the first causally irrelevant actions modelled and 
six of the second causally irrelevant actions modelled. As already outlined, 
there were marked differences in children’s responses between conditions. 
For example, only one child in the Goal Apparent condition copied the second 
irrelevant actions more than 6 times, whereas 10 children did so in the No 
Goal condition. There were also notable within condition differences. For 
example, in the Goal Unclear condition, 5 children did not copy the second 
irrelevant actions at all whereas 3 children did so more than 10 times. 
Highlighting these differences, Figure 3 presents the frequency with which 
each child produced the first and second irrelevant actions across conditions.   
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Figure 3. Frequency of each child’s imitation of the first (1) and second (2) 
causally irrelevant actions across conditions.  
Discussion  
From the benign to the life altering, recurring daily or annually, 
engaging in rituals is a significant and ubiquitous aspect of human behavior. 
To become valued, active participants of their cultural in-group children must 
be able to identify rituals, and recognize what it is about them that is 
important to learn and replicate. The research presented here suggests that 
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young children are sensitive to causal opacity and goal demotion as cues to 
help them identify culturally bound behaviors, showing that, as expected, 
when actions are fully goal demoted they are repeated at much higher rates 
than when there is the appearance of a discernable goal linked to the actions.  
 As has been previously demonstrated (Nielsen et al., 2015) and 
extended here to a new cultural group, children reproduce modelled actions 
if they are associated with a clear functional outcome regardless of where that 
outcome is placed in the sequence. Children who saw causally irrelevant 
actions demonstrated after the afforded goal of the sequence had been 
satisfied reproduced those actions at similar rates to children who saw the 
same causally irrelevant actions immediately before the goal was satisfied. 
This suggests that, where there is an afforded goal, any action in a modelled 
sequence can be treated as if it is associated with the goal, regardless of how 
implausible that might be (see also Schleihauf, Graetz, Pauen, & Hoehl, 2017).  
Nevertheless, when a sequence did not afford inference to a goal 
children not only copied causally irrelevant actions, but did so with greater 
frequency than was modelled. This effect is most stark for the second causally 
irrelevant action, in which children in the No Goal condition reproduced, on 
average, three times as many redundant actions as were modelled. We 
maintain that this condition signals that the behavior performed is ritualistic 
because the actions are causally irrelevant and the inference to an intention or 
goal for the actions performed is absent. It is important to note that in the 
three conditions where a sticker was present, trials were terminated when the 
sticker was retrieved.  It is thus possible that had children been left to 
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continue they might have opted to act out the second irrelevant action to 
levels equivalent to those in the No Goal condition. Given prior evidence that 
children will cease imitating when they have achieved what they interpret to 
be the goal of a demonstrated object-directed action (e.g., Loucks & Meltzoff, 
2013), we consider this unlikely.  
The findings reported here shed light on now classic studies of social 
learning in which children’s imitation of specific gestural actions was shown 
to be more accurate when there was no apparent goal to them (such as 
touching dots on a table; Gattis, Bekkering, & Wohlschlager, 2002). Removing 
the goal has been previously interpreted as taking away a layer of complexity 
in the demonstrated sequence, allowing children to focus instead on the 
specific movements modelled. The current results suggest an alternative: In 
the absence of a goal state the actions are interpreted within a ritualistic 
framework and emphasis is hence placed on more precise reproduction.  It is 
also possible that children process modelled actions that aren’t associated 
with a tangible goal as invitations to engage in something like a “do as I 
do/copying game” activity. However, such a perspective, in the context of the 
current experiment, fails to explain the high rate of replication in the No Goal 
condition.   
 In some rituals, an action should be repeated a prescribed number of 
times – no more and no less. As it is the case that when an action cannot be 
identified as serving a particular causal relationship or a specific motivation, 
there is no better or best way to perform it. Children in the No Goal condition 
could thus be seen as violating such a rule through their excess reproduction 
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of the second irrelevant action. That said, a cautionary approach to the 
problem would be to over-perform, rather than under-perform, when 
uncertain (a la Wood et al., 2016). What the current data indicate is that in 
young children precise frequency copying likely depends on explicit 
instruction and is not a default approach. Research is now needed to detail 
when children might choose to reproduce a modelled action precisely the 
same number of times as modelled and when (and why) they might, as in the 
current experiment, choose to copy at a higher frequency.   
The reactions of children in the Goal Unclear condition (in which the 
sticker was in the box, but was not interacted with) was not statistically 
different from the reactions of children in the Goal Apparent and Goal 
Available conditions. Children in this condition could see a potential reason 
for the demonstrated actions - retrieving the sticker initially hidden inside the 
boxes - but any surety about the goal would have been corrupted by the 
adult’s failure to satisfy this affordance. As noted, whereas three children in 
this condition replicated the second causally irrelevant actions 10 times or 
more, five children did not reproduce them at all. This suggests that for some 
children the action was seen in a ritualistic light, while for others it was not 
(see Figure 3). This surprising finding warrants future exploration, along with 
targeted research aimed at identifying the individual differences that lead 
some children to imitate with high frequency repetition and others not (e.g., 
as evident in the No Goal condition).    
It has been argued that causal opacity and goal demotion are common 
qualities of many rituals, and that these features allow observers to identify 
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an action sequence as a ritual rather than as an ordinary alternative (Nielbo & 
Sørensen, 2011; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013), thus cuing different behavioral and 
cognitive responses (Kapitány & Nielsen, 2017). However, while there is now 
a large corpus of research charting children’s reactions to causally opaque 
actions, there is scant investigation of goal demotion and, to the best of our 
knowledge, no prior study that has directly set out to chart this in young 
children. In this context it is important to note we do not consider that these 
qualities are easily disentangled. Indeed, our perspective is that they most 
commonly co-occur. In the current study, each of the irrelevant actions was 
causally opaque. What we varied was the level of goal information associated 
with them. Our contention is that causally transparent actions (that do not 
have any historical and exegetical associations) will be interpreted as 
functional, whereas causally opaque actions prime the ritual stance, an 
interpretation increasingly likely to be made as goal information becomes 
increasingly demoted.   
 Why might children show this inclination to copy ritualistic actions? 
We believe the answer is twofold. First, human survival depends on others 
and as a consequence the capacity for ingratiating oneself to one’s cultural in-
group is of paramount importance. Rituals are a means of signaling group 
identification in this way. Second, over 1.5 million years ago our hominin 
ancestors began the Acheulean lithic complex with its characteristic handaxes 
and cleavers (Beyene et al., 2013). It is argued that the propagation of this 
industry depended on the emergence of a mind prone to overimitate (Nielsen, 
2012; Rossano, 2017; Shipton & Nielsen, 2015) and that once established such 
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a mind readily lent itself to exaptation in the form of ritual behavior (Rossano, 
2012; Wilks et al., 2016). Early sensitivity to detect and willingness to 
reproduce ritual actions is thus likely to have been subject to significant 
evolutionary pressure (Nielsen, under review). Moreover, while the present 
study (and much of the overimitation literature) examines 
ritualistic behaviour directed toward objects, it is the case that a great deal of 
ritualistic action is performed in the service of group identification and group 
bonding (Wen, Herrmann, & Legare, 2016; Whitehouse, 2004). Thus, a child 
who demonstrates willingness to learn, adopt, and replicate group-relevant 
ritualistic practices may be perceived as an increasingly competent, if 
immature, group member (Clegg & Legare, 2016; Clegg, Wen, & Legare, 
2017). That we observe such a tendency under somewhat impoverished social 
circumstances is support for our argument that two of the key, foundational 
features, of ritual cognition are causal opacity and goal demotion.   
There are many social and cognitive attributes that mark our species as 
strikingly different to those we share the planet with, and engaging in ritual 
behavior should be considered among the most prominent. In lacking clear 
and obvious causal outcomes, ritualized behaviors present a raft of challenges 
to a young mind trying to make sense of the world. At the same time as they 
are presented with the challenges of mastering use of a host of objects 
children must simultaneously make sense of a myriad of behaviors that 
appear not to achieve any immediate, tangible outcome yet are treated as 
important by those who practice them. Here we establish for the first time 
how causal opacity and goal demotion can function in conjunction with each 
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other to yield unique markers that actions should be processed as ritualistic, 
and as a result reproduced with a frequency that differs starkly from actions 
that do not share these features. This provides new and unique insight into 
what makes us who we are. 
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